Behavior as mind-in-context: A cultural psychology analysis of "paranoid" suspicion by Adams, Glenn E. et al.
 277 
14
Behavior as Mind in Context
A Cultural Psychology Analysis 
of “Paranoid” Suspicion 
in West African Worlds
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PhiA s. sAlter 
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tuçe Kurti 
niA l. PhilliPs
 Just because you’re paranoid doesn’t mean they aren’t  
 after you.
     — Attributed to Kurt Cobain (among others)
Like some other contributors to this book (Kitayama & imada, 
chapter 9), we approach the theme of “mind in context” from the per-
spective of cultural psychology (cP). this theme is central to the concept 
of culture, which we define as explicit and implicit patterns of histori-
cally derived and selected ideas and their material manifestations in 
institutions, practices, and artifacts (Adams & markus, 2004, based on 
Kroeber & Kluckhohn, 1952, p. 357). in contrast to popular associa-
tions of culture with group, this statement explicitly defines culture as 
structures of mind in context: “patterns of ideas . . . and their material 
manifestations” in everyday worlds. Associated with this definition is a 
conception of culture not as membership in rigidly bounded groups, but 
rather as engagement with flexible structures of mind in context distrib-
uted across unbounded worlds.
From The Mind in Context. Edited by Batja Mesquita, Lisa Feldman Barrett, and Eliot R. Smith. 
Copyright 2010 by The Guilford Press. All rights reserved. 
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the key to our discussion of behavior as mind in context comes 
from the second half of this definition: Cultural patterns may be con-
sidered both products of action and as conditioning elements of further 
action (also based on Kroeber and Kluckhohn, 1952, p. 357; see Adams 
& markus, 2004). Although theory and research in psychology typi-
cally portray behavior as the end product of experience, a cP analysis 
implies a more dynamic conception in which behavior—and its inten-
tional counterpart, action (Bruner, 1990)—is also a “conditioning ele-
ment” of further experience. As such, behavior and its observable sedi-
ment constitute intentional worlds: structures of mind in context that 
not only bear psychological traces of previous behavior and action, but 
also direct subsequent behavior and action toward particular ends.
“Mind in Context” as Cultural Psychology
A cP analysis illuminates the theme of “mind in context” in two impor-
tant senses that we have represented in Figure 14.1. the top arrow of 
Figure 14.1 refers to the cultural constitution of psychological experi-
ence: the idea that human experience is not the simple expression of 
inborn genetic programming, but instead requires incorporation or 
embodiment (literally, taking into the body) of structures of mind in 
context. these structures are not merely interpretative frames applied 
after the fact to make sense of experience, but instead are constitutive 
of behavior and experience; that is, behavior and experience would not 
emerge as they do without the ecological scaffolding that structures of 
mind in context provide. the implication is that to understand observed 
regularities of psychological functioning one must understand the often 
ignored structures of mind in context—including cultural models (hol-
land & Quinn, 1987), social representations (moscovici, 1984), and 
discursive repertoires (Potter & Wetherell, 1987)—that provide the eco-
logical scaffolding for these regularities.
the bottom arrow of Figure 14.1 refers to the psychological con-
stitution of cultural worlds: the idea that the world is not a natural 
object separate from human action, but instead is a psychological prod-
uct. in the course of everyday experience, people continually reproduce 
structures of mind in context, into which they inscribe and objectify 
their beliefs and desires (Berger & luckmann, 1966; moscovici, 1984). 
rather than an inert mass, the observable sediment of people’s behav-
ior carries a psychological charge that exerts independent influence on 
subsequent action. the implication is something like mind in society 
(Vygotsky, 1978): the idea that the structure of mind is not limited to 
brain architecture but also extends to psychological traces of behavioral 
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sediment deposited in everyday worlds (see Gosling, Ko, mannarelli, & 
morris, 2002; morling & lamoreaux, 2008)
to summarize, the structures of mind in brain that are the typi-
cal focus of psychological research exist in a dynamic relationship of 
mutual constitution—the idea that “psyche and culture . . . make each 
other up” (shweder, 1990, p. 1)—with structures of mind in context. 
looking backward, these structures of mind in context represent the 
psychological sediment of previous behavior and experience. looking 
forward, these structures of mind in context provide the ecological scaf-
folding for subsequent behavior and experience. underlying structures 
of mind in context typically remain invisible or unrecognized in main-
stream psychological research. the task of a cP analysis is to illuminate 
them.
Overview Of empirical examples
to illustrate this approach to “mind in context” we consider three 
cases of apparently “paranoid” suspicion in West African worlds: cau-
fiGUre 14.1. mutual constitution of mind and context. the structures of 
mind in brain that are the typical focus of psychological research exist in a 
dynamic relationship of mutual constitution with structures of mind in context. 
these ecological structures of mind in context function as intentional worlds 
(shweder, 1990): deposits of behavioral sediment that not only reflect beliefs 
and desires implicit in previous action (bottom arrow) but also direct subse-
quent behavior and action toward particular ends (top arrow).
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tion about intimate relationship (Adams, 2005), an outbreak of penis-
shrinking panic (Adams & dzokoto, 2007), and suspicion of racism in a 
vaccination campaign (Obadare, 2005). these cases resemble paranoid 
behavior to the extent that they involve people’s unwarranted concern 
that they are the target of malice; however, a cP analysis involves two 
steps that suggest reconsideration of the “paranoid” label (Adams & 
salter, 2007). the first step is to normalize apparently paranoid behav-
ior; rather than lack of contact with reality, apparently paranoid behav-
ior may reflect normal engagement with ecological structures of mind in 
context that promote concern about malice. the second step is to dena-
ture the sense of freedom from malice; rather than the natural expres-
sion of inborn programming, this pattern may reflect structures of mind 
in context that insulate people from concern about malice. table 14.1 
provides an overview of the structures of mind in context associated 
with both naturalizing (left column) and denaturing (right column) steps 
for each of the three empirical cases.
Beware Of friends: 
Cautious aPProaChes to relationshiP
if one walks through a taxi stand in various West African worlds, one 
is likely to find cars with stickers or painted slogans (e.g., “Beware of 
friends” or “i am afraid of my friends, even you”) that advise caution 
about personal relationship. resonating with these bits of mind in con-
text, research consistently reveals that people across a variety of West 
African worlds report a smaller network of friends, express doubts 
about intimate disclosure, and express greater concern about enemies in 
intimate spaces than do people across diverse American worlds (Adams, 
2005; Adams & Plaut, 2003). how is one to understand these differ-
ences?
the tendency in psychological science is to view caution about rela-
tionship, to the degree observed in West African settings, as an abnor-
mal deviation from natural reality. indeed, within mainstream psychol-
ogy and the worlds that it reflects, the claim to be the target of hidden 
enemies is a sign of paranoia (with connotations of delusion). similarly, 
research in mainstream psychology has emphasized the importance of 
emotional intimacy and self-disclosure for relationship well-being and 
production of closeness (Altman & taylor, 1973; laurenceau, Barrett, 
& Pietromonaco, 1998). From this perspective, one might regard the 
reluctance to share intimate information observed in many West African 
worlds as a suboptimal form of relationship (e.g., avoidant attachment) 
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TaBle 14.1. structures of mind in context That Underlie (responses 
to) apparently “paranoid” suspicion
normalizing “paranoid” suspicion in 
West African worlds
denaturing lack of suspicion in north 
American worlds
example 1: cautious approaches to 
relationship
turning the lens: Open approaches to 
relationship 
embedded-interdependent selfways •	
(Adams & dzokoto, 2003; carrier, 
1999; markus et al., 1997) 
relational models: authority ranking •	
and communal sharing (Fiske, 1991) 
Practices of secrecy associated with  •	
concerns about exposure (shaw, 2000) 
Arranged marriage focused on comple-•	
mentary roles; lifelong residence with 
extended kin (Adams et al., 2004)
Voluntaristic-independent selfways •	
(Adams & dzokoto, 2003; carrier, 
1999; markus et al., 1997) 
relational models: market pricing and •	
equality matching (Fiske, 1991) 
Practices of self-expression and affec-•	
tive individualism (Bellah et al., 1985; 
O’conner, 1998; Oliker, 1998) 
companionate marriage based on •	
romantic love; neolocal residence with 
nuclear family (Adams et al., 2004)
example 2: mass episodes of genital-
shrinking panic
turning the lens: Biomedical model  
of illness
habits associated with embedded- •	
interdependent selfways: holistic  
perception (nisbett et al., 2001);  
somatization of affect (dzokoto & 
Okazaki, 2006); and sense of openness 
to interpersonal influence (reisman, 
1986). 
Practices and artifacts that “objectify” •	
or “make real” sorcery and witchcraft 
(Geschiere, 1997; Kirby, 1993; meyer, 
2003)
habits associated with voluntaristic-•	
independent selfways: analytic percep-
tion (nisbett et al., 2001); dualistic 
separation of mind and body; and sense 
of imperviousness to interpersonal  
influence (Adams, 2005). 
tools for diagnosis and treatment of •	
distress (e.g., dsm-iV; see Adams & 
salter, 2007)
example 3: Perception of racism  
in health care systems
turning the lens: denial of racism  
in u.s. society
collective memory of colonialism and •	
awareness about past incidents of rac-
ism (Adams et al., 2006; eiser & ellis, 
2007) 
community discourse and social rep-•	
resentations about present incidents of 
racism (turner, 1994) 
Official apology of the u.s. govern-•	
ment for tuskegee syphilis experi-
ment (White house Office of the Press 
secretary, 1997)
Atomistic pedagogies of racism as •	
individual bias or prejudice (Adams et 
al., 2008) 
sanitized representations of history that •	
“white out” unflattering acts of past 
racism (salter & Adams, 2009) 
color-blind or glorifying constructions •	
of u.s. identity (Phillips & Adams, 
2009)
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(collins & read, 1990; dion & dion, 1985; mikulincer & nachshon, 
1991). Alternatively, one might interpret practices of caution as a form 
of self-silencing (Jack, 1991): inhibition and suppression (rather than 
indulgence and expression) of personal thoughts and feelings. research 
has associated self-silencing with decreased relationship satisfaction, 
especially among women in heterosexual relationships (see harper & 
Welsh, 2007; Jack, 1991).
normalizing Caution
rather than consider it a manifestation of abnormality, a cP approach 
explains caution about relationship in West African settings as a sign of 
normal sensitivity to structures of mind in context: embedded-interde-
pendent selfways that promote both a sense of rootedness in context and 
an experience of relationship as an ecological affordance (i.e., inherent 
in the structure of everyday life; see Adams, Anderson, & Adonu, 2004; 
markus, mullally, & Kitayama, 1997). embedded-interdependent self-
ways are not just a set of ideas about connection, but also include the 
“material manifestation” of ideas in concrete realities such as limited 
social and spatial mobility; the daily practice of eating together from 
communal bowls; institutions associated with arranged, often polyga-
mous marriage (see dodoo, 1998); and lifelong communal coresidence 
in extended-family compounds. these structures of mind in context pro-
mote “thick” or “sticky” forms of relationship characterized by dense, 
overlapping networks and mutual obligations of material support. these 
structures promote caution about relationship because they imply limi-
tations on people’s capacity to choose connections or to insulate them-
selves from the potential friction that accompanies embeddedness.
in worlds where embedded interdependent selfways provide the eco-
logical scaffolding for experience, the construction of emotional inti-
macy through self-disclosure may be less imperative for well-being than 
mainstream research suggests (chen, 1995). One reason has to do with 
lack of motivation. the dense networks of connection associated with 
worlds of embedded interdependence render practices of mutual disclo-
sure unnecessary for the production of common ground. instead, com-
mon ground may arise as a by-product of interaction with a relatively 
constant, interrelated set of people (holtgraves, 1997). Another reason 
has to do with concerns about privacy and self-protection. the overlap-
ping nature of relationship networks in worlds of embedded interdepen-
dence affords the possibility that violations of privacy due to revelation 
of secrets will cause more harm than would occur if one’s relationships 
were compartmentalized and distributed across widely dispersed net-
works. in these settings, psychological well-being may be associated 
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with structures of mind in context that promote guarded management of 
information rather than open disclosure (shaw, 2000).
likewise, the implications of silence for relationship satisfaction 
may be less damaging in worlds where embedded-interdependent self-
ways provide the ecological scaffolding for experience. For example, 
research among women in a turkish setting indicates a positive cor-
relation between apparent “self-silencing” and satisfaction in romantic 
relationships (Kurti, 2009). A likely source of this correlation lies in the 
structures of mind in context—including a strong emphasis on relation-
ship, family integrity, loyalty, and conflict avoidance (imamolu, 1987; 
Kaitçibai, 1973, 1984)—associated with embedded-interdependent 
selfways that inform traditional turkish worlds. self-silencing may be 
valuable to the extent that inhibition of personal needs and opinions 
reduces the potential for interpersonal friction that can have particularly 
disastrous consequences in worlds of embedded interdependence. tradi-
tional gender roles further legitimize the status of silence among turkish 
women, making self-silencing a normative practice and therefore less 
hazardous for personal and relationship well-being.
in short, a cP analysis suggests that relationship tendencies of 
caution and guarded silence observed in West African settings are not 
manifestations of pathology. instead these tendencies reflect particular 
structures of mind in context: the ecological scaffolding for relationship 
associated with embedded-interdependent selfways.
turning the analytic lens: Denaturing openness
Besides providing a “normalizing” account of caution about relation-
ship in West African worlds, an equally important contribution of a cP 
analysis is to denature the open approach to relationship (and associated 
sense of freedom from enemies) that masquerades as “natural” in main-
stream psychology. contrary to the portrayal as simple human nature, 
a cP analysis links this way of being to structures of mind-in-context: 
voluntaristic-independent selfways that promote both a sense of insu-
lation from context and an experience of relationship as the tenuous 
creation of inherently separate selves (Adams et al., 2004). Again, volun-
taristic-independent selfways are not just a set of ideas about separation, 
but also include the “material manifestation” of ideas in such concrete 
realities as mobility-affording transportation and communication infra-
structure, the practice of “leaving home” in young adulthood, the daily 
practice of eating from individual place settings, and residence in self-
contained apartment units. resonating with what Fiske (1991) called a 
market-pricing (mP) model of relationship, these structures of mind in 
context promote an experience of the social world as a relatively friction-
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less “free market” populated by unfettered “free agents” who are both 
enabled and compelled to arrange their own connections. People feel free 
not only to construct a broad network of friends but also to avoid nega-
tive consequences of connection (including personal enemies).
From this perspective, apparently standard patterns of relationship 
observed in mainstream psychology—including the prominence of emo-
tional intimacy, self-disclosure, and their implications for well-being 
and closeness—are not a simple expression of their natural importance. 
instead these patterns reflect structures of mind in context associated 
with voluntaristic-independent selfways. One set of structures concern 
practices of self-expression associated with affective individualism: a 
value emphasis on exploration, expression, and indulgence of unique, 
individual feelings (Baumeister, 1987; Bellah, madsen, sullivan, swin-
dler, & tipton, 1985; Kim, 2002; Kim & sherman, 2007). Another set 
of structures concerns relatively direct communication styles. the rela-
tively thin forms of relationship that prevail in settings of voluntaris-
tic independence do not afford a deep sense of “common ground” that 
permits people to leave much unsaid (holtgraves, 1997). As a result, 
people must create common ground through processes of mutual disclo-
sure (O’conner, 1998; Oliker, 1998). similarly, because local worlds do 
not afford a sense of inherent commonality and interdependence, people 
attempt to create commonality through joint purchases, jointly designed 
living space, or other practices of place making that produce material 
interdependence (lohmann, Arriaga, & Goodfriend, 2003). rather 
than consider these practices as inherent motivations for self-expres-
sion wired into brain architecture, one can interpret such practices of 
self-disclosure and domestic place making as cultural innovations for 
the production of emotional intimacy. As such, these practices provide 
important means to ensure connection and satisfaction in worlds where 
voluntaristic-independent selfways provide the ecological scaffolding for 
experience.
extension: the importance of attractiveness  
in everyday life
As the preceding section illustrates, a cP analysis applies the theme of 
mind in context to explain not only to explain apparently abnormal 
phenomena observed in exotic, “other” cultures, but also apparently 
“natural” phenomena observed in the familiar settings that dominate 
mainstream research. From this perspective, many relationship phenom-
ena reported in the typical psychology study are not, as mainstream 
scientific accounts are inclined to portray them, natural expressions of 
inborn tendencies encoded in brain architecture. instead, they are eco-
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logically grounded habits of relationship that are continually reconsti-
tuted as people necessarily tune themselves to structures of mind in con-
text. having illuminated these structures of mind in context, it becomes 
easier to see them at work in other relationship phenomena.
For example, consider one of the best-known relationship phenom-
ena in social psychology: the importance of attractiveness in everyday 
life. decades of research have documented that attractive people experi-
ence better outcomes than do unattractive people (see langlois et al., 
2000). standard accounts typically locate these effects in evolved brain 
structures (e.g., Buss, 1989; thornhill & Gangestad, 1999). in con-
trast, a cP perspective suggests that attractiveness effects also reflect 
local selfways and other structures of mind in context. the relationship 
between attraction and life outcomes may be greatest in worlds where 
voluntaristic-independent selfways provide the ecological scaffolding for 
experience. in worlds that afford people freedom (and compel them) to 
choose their own relationships, preference (as a determinant of choice) 
and attraction (as a determinant of preference) gain importance in rela-
tionship life. Attraction may be less important in worlds of embedded 
interdependence, where the thicker or stickier nature of relationship 
means that personal choice and preference have less impact on life out-
comes.
in support of these ideas, research suggests that the relationship 
between attractiveness and self-reported life outcomes is greater not 
only (1) in north American settings than in West African settings but 
also (2) in friend than in family relationships, and (3) in urban than 
in rural spaces (see Anderson, Adams, & Plaut, 2008, study 1; Plaut, 
Adams, & Anderson, in press). likewise, research suggests that physical 
attractiveness stereotyping—the tendency to rate anticipated outcomes 
of attractive people more positively than those of unattractive people—
is not only greater in the united states than in Ghanaian settings and 
in urban rather than rural spaces but also (within Ghanaian settings) 
is greater among people “primed” to think about personal characteris-
tics than personal connections (Anderson et al., 2008, study 2). rather 
than a natural property of mind in brain, this research suggests that the 
importance of attractiveness for life outcomes reflects structures of mind 
in context associated with voluntaristic-independent selfways.
disappearinG penises: 
GeniTal-shrinkinG panic
if one stays in West African settings for an extended period, one is likely 
to encounter something like the episode of genital-shrinking panic (GsP) 
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that occurred at several sites in Ghana during January 1997 (dzokoto 
& Adams, 2005).1 in its typical presentations, GsP refers to the mass 
occurrence of distress in which men fear that their penises are shrink-
ing due to magical theft. People in the 1997 episode typically attributed 
the motivation for such theft to the desire for money, either by holding 
stolen genitalia for ransom or by using them as ingredients for the pro-
duction of “money medicine.” in any case, the accusation of penis theft 
placed the accused thief in mortal danger from beatings that bystanders 
often administered as “instant justice” (see Adams & dzokoto, 2007; 
dzokoto & Adams, 2005; mather, 2005).
normalizing Genital shrinking Panic
As with cautious approaches to relationship, outsider accounts are likely 
to frame GsP incidents as cases of paranoid behavior to the extent that 
they involve irrational fear of harm. indeed, for people in highly edu-
cated worlds, the belief that people could steal penises through sorcery 
or witchcraft seems like exactly the sort of “superstitious nonsense”—
reflecting delusion or lack of contact with reality—that science combats 
(Jackson, 1998). in contrast, a cP perspective suggests that what predis-
poses people to GsP is not paranoid delusion, superstitious ignorance, or 
lack of contact with reality, but normal sensitivity to structures of mind 
in context.
Cultural Grounding of Genital-Shrinking Panic
these structures of mind in context include specific concepts or institu-
tions. As hinted in the previous paragraph, a prevailing construction of 
reality that underlies concerns about both penis theft and malicious false 
accusation is the set of concepts referred to in english as witchcraft, sor-
cery, or juju (see de-Graft Aikins, 2004; Geschiere, 1997; meyer, 2003). 
these concepts propose not only magical means through which penis 
theft might occur but also the existence of malicious enemies who seek 
to do harm (whether through magical or nonmagical means). regardless 
of whether people typically “believe in” them, witchcraft and sorcery are 
prominent local concepts that are readily available for people to appro-
priate when—as in the case of GsP—doing so helps them make sense of 
everyday events.
in addition, the reference to mind in context includes more general 
cultural models. For example, research associates the embedded-interde-
pendent selfways to which we referred in the previous section with sev-
eral habits of being that may actively foster penis-shrinking experience 
(dzokoto & Adams, 2005). these habits include a sense of openness to 
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interpersonal influence and automatic tuning to social context (ries-
man, 1986); “holistic” perceptual habits that direct attention to con-
textual sources of experience (see nisbett, Peng, choi, & norenzayan, 
2001); and somatization: the tendency to experience negative affect in 
bodily rather than psychological forms (e.g., ryder et al., 2008). these 
habits of mind are not superficial interpretations applied to more basic 
experience; instead they play a constitutive role in GsP, such that mass 
episodes would not occur without the scaffolding that these models and 
representations provide (Good, 1994). to the extent that people inhabit 
spaces where these habits of mind are (or become) prominent, they are 
(or become) more likely to experience GsP.
Dynamic Reproduction of Genital-Shrinking Panic Reality
so far, this discussion of GsP has emphasized processes of incorporation 
or embodiment, represented by the top arrow in Figure 14.1, by which 
patterns of mind inscribed in local worlds come to shape psychological 
experience. however, an adequate account of GsP and its relationship 
to structures of mind in context must also direct attention to the pro-
cesses of inscription or objectification, represented by the bottom arrow 
in Figure 14.1, by which everyday belief and behavior reproduce cultural 
reality.
One way in which beliefs about GsP create their own reality is an 
intrapersonal version of self-fulfilling prophecy.2 in this version, episodes 
of GsP activate ecological structures of mind in context that promote a 
charged atmosphere of heightened sensitivity to potential malice. in this 
charged atmosphere, an otherwise innocuous event can trigger a man’s 
concern that he is the target of penis tampering. this concern can arouse 
intense anxiety and somatic reactions, especially in relatively plastic 
organs like genitalia, which the man is likely to interpret as confirmation 
rather than a consequence of his anxious beliefs. this interpretation is 
likely to create more anxiety, which increases the physiological response 
of shrinking, which creates more anxiety, and so on, in a self-fulfilling 
spiral (see Oyebode, Jamieson, mullaney, & davison, 1986).
Another way in which beliefs about GsP create their own reality 
is an interpersonal version of self-fulfilling prophecy akin to behavioral 
confirmation of stereotypes and other interpersonal expectations (sny-
der, 1984). in this version, ecological structures of mind in context asso-
ciated with GsP include an atmosphere of interpersonal suspicion that 
has self-fulfilling consequences. if a man meets a woman in town and 
appears reluctant to return her greeting, this behavioral performance 
constitutes an instance of mind in context associated with distrust. Based 
on her observation of the man’s behavioral performance, the woman 
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may infer that he dislikes her, and she may respond with suspicion-laden 
behavior of her own. her behavioral performance further reproduces 
ecological structures of mind in context associated with distrust, which 
the man may interpret as confirmation of his initial suspicions, without 
recognizing his role in eliciting her response. the man’s interpretation 
may lead to further performances of suspicion, triggering more suspi-
cion-laden responses, and so on, in a self-fulfilling spiral.
resonating with most work, our example has portrayed behavioral 
confirmation as a dyadic process. to appreciate implications for the 
theme of mind in context, one must extend the analysis beyond the level 
of dyadic interaction (claire & Fiske, 1998). Behavioral performances 
of suspicion do more than produce isolated dyads of dislike; in addition, 
they reproduce ecological structures of mind in context that promote 
suspicion and GsP among extradyadic observers.
likewise, one must extend the analysis of behavioral confirmation 
beyond confirmation of stereotypes or other expectations to consider 
implications for the reproduction of reality in general. each time people 
invoke concepts such as sorcery, they not only reproduce those concepts 
in their original domains of relevance (e.g., erectile dysfunction), but 
also often extend them to new domains (e.g., school examinations and 
international soccer matches; Geschiere, 1997, p. 4). likewise, whether 
people believe claims of penis theft (and participate in administration of 
instant justice) or construe claims as false accusation (and intervene hero-
ically to rescue the accused person), their actions constitute behavioral 
artifacts that serve as informational social influence or emergent norms 
to guide others’ subsequent responses (deutsch & Gerard, 1955; stahl, 
1982). in general, people’s behavioral responses to individual cases of 
GsP often reinscribe and reconstitute the structures of mind in context 
that are constitutive of GsP experience in the first place. this idea has 
three important implications.
First, processes of inscription and objectification represented by the 
bottom arrow of Figure 14.1 are essential to the “epidemic” character of 
GsP episodes. in the initial stages of an episode, the structures of mind 
in context that promote GsP may be relatively inactive, such that only 
people who are especially situated to experience GsP do so. however, 
the subsequent behavior of these “early adopters” strengthens or acti-
vates the facilitating structures of mind in context that underlie GsP, 
such that they eventually promote GsP experience among people who 
were originally less situated to experience it. Without this active recon-
stitution of the structures of mind in context that are constitutive of 
GsP, it is unlikely that GsP would impact so many people.
second, processes of inscription and objectification help to illumi-
nate the collective nature of GsP. What makes GsP collective is not its 
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“group” character (i.e., that it occurred in mass episodes rather than 
isolated cases) but instead the extent to which each person’s distress is 
afforded by the fertile common ground that the behavioral sediment of 
other people’s experience provides. rather than the aggregate of mul-
tiple, isolated individuals constructing similar experience from the same 
raw materials, mass episodes occur because each person constructs an 
experience by using the scaffolding provided by the accumulated, mate-
rial sediment of others’ behavior.
third, this reference to behavioral sediment helps to illuminate the 
idea of “mind in society.” the structures of mind in context that provide 
fertile common ground for GsP are not only embodied in individual sub-
jectivity but also are objectified in everyday worlds (Berger & luckmann, 
1966; moscovici, 1984). rather than transmission from one individual 
to another across a psychological vacuum, the process of social influence 
associated with GsP flows through ecologically inscribed structures of 
mind in context.
turning the analytic lens:  
Denaturing the Biomedical Model
Besides providing a normalizing account of GsP in West African set-
tings, the second task of a cP analysis is to provide a denaturing account 
that illuminates the typically invisible structures of mind in context that 
inform responses to GsP in mainstream health science. Perhaps the 
most important of these structures is the prevailing biomedical model 
of health and illness. the key points associated with this model include 
a construction of health as freedom from suffering; an emphasis on bio-
chemical and physiological processes; and a corresponding inattention 
to social-psychological determinants of well-being, illness, diagnosis, 
and healing.
rather than a culture-neutral reflection of natural reality, the bio-
medical model resonates with the atomistic or independent selfways 
characteristic of “modern” societies: structures of mind in context that 
propose abstraction of person from social context and locate the roots 
of experience in the internal properties of existentially separate individu-
als. Although this particular cultural foundation provides conceptual 
advantages for understanding biochemical and physiological manifesta-
tions of health and illness, it creates problems for understanding other 
manifestations. resonating with the topic of this section, one problem 
with the biomedical model is that it tends to obscure the extent to which 
embodied beliefs—and the ecological structures of mind in context to 
which embodied beliefs are continuously tuned—are constitutive of 
bodily experience. As a result, mainstream health science has difficulty 
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accommodating phenomena such as placebo effects (harrington, 1999) 
or mass psychogenic illness (colligan, Pennebaker, & murphy, 1982), in 
which belief plays a central role.
resonating with the topic of the next section, another problem with 
the biomedical model is that its internal gaze and atomistic focus obscure 
structural, socioeconomic, and geopolitical forces associated with socio-
ecological variation in health and disease (see mirowsky & ross, 2003; 
Williams & collins, 1995). regardless of individual scientists’ inten-
tions, an atomistic focus on physiological processes constitutes a politi-
cally consequential “intentional world” that, by ignoring structural 
determinants of ill health (e.g., malnutrition and poverty), contributes 
to the reproduction of disease and discomfort in marginalized spaces 
(see hepworth, 2006). From this perspective, an adequate health science 
requires greater attention to the structures of mind in context that influ-
ence not only the experience but also the study of health and illness (see 
Adams & salter, 2007).
sUspiciOn Of vaccine TamperinG: 
failUre Of The GlOBal 
pOliO eradicaTiOn iniTiaTive
in 1988, worldwide health organizations launched a global initiative to 
eradicate poliomyelitis virus (Global Polio eradication initiative, www.
polioeradication.org). Although the campaign came close to its goal, it 
stalled (and eventually reversed) in the face of popular resistance to vac-
cination drives in northern nigeria. At issue were concerns that doses of 
oral polio vaccine (OPV) were contaminated with hiV or were designed 
to render female children infertile as means of population control (Ajiya, 
2003). As with suspicion of enemies and incidents of GsP, acts of OPV 
refusal constitute paranoid behavior to the extent that they appear to 
involve irrational fear of harm. indeed, international health organiza-
tions generally framed people’s suspicions as “unfounded concerns,” 
which they hoped that health workers could alleviate by exposing peo-
ple to “correct” knowledge (WhO news, 2004). in contrast to such 
relatively pathologizing characterizations of OPV refusal, a cP analysis 
emphasizes two points (Adams & salter, 2007).
normalizing suspicion of Vaccine tampering
First, without endorsing claims of vaccine tampering or advocating vac-
cine refusal, a cP approach normalizes suspicion of vaccine tampering. 
rather as “unfounded concern,” these suspicions have a reasonable 
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foundation in structures of mind in context associated with collective 
memory of racism (Adams & salter, 2007; see Whaley, 2001). People 
who refuse OPV may do so not because of ignorance or delusion, but 
because they are more educated about past incidents of racism than are 
people who accept OPV. these incidents include documented cases of 
medical racism, such as the tuskegee syphilis study (Freimuth et al., 
2001), sterilization practices designed to control population growth 
among people of African descent (mass, 1977), or practices for research 
in African settings that the same researchers would find unacceptable in 
european or u.s. settings (lurie & Wolfe, 1997).
turning the analytic lens:  
Denaturing Denial of racism
second, a cP analysis denatures scientific common sense. rather than 
unbiased reflection of truth, trust in the nonracist character of medi-
cal science or other mainstream institutions may reflect faith, denial, or 
outright ignorance. From this perspective, mainstream reactions to OPV 
refusal are not based on neutral reading of events but instead reflect an 
“unfounded” inclination by the medical and scientific establishment to 
deny pervasive racism and remnants of colonialism.
empirical evidence relevant to this point comes from our research 
on group differences in perception of racism in u.s. society. relative to 
people from a variety of historically oppressed groups, white Americans 
tend to deny the extent to which racism is responsible for events in u.s. 
society. in part, this group difference in perception of racism reflects 
divergent motivational pressures. White Americans are motivated to 
deny the ongoing significance of racism to preserve a sense of collec-
tive self-worth and to defend the legitimacy of a status quo from which 
they derive benefits (Adams, tormala, & O’Brien, 2006; Branscombe, 
schmitt, & harvey, 1999). however, even when people genuinely strive 
for an honest assessment, group differences can also result because dif-
ferent communities inhabit and reproduce different ecologies of mind 
in context that promote divergent judgments about the ongoing signifi-
cance of racism. We have investigated this idea with respect to three 
different manifestations of mind in context.
Representations of Racism
One manifestation concerns representations of racism itself. relative 
to people from various oppressed groups, white Americans are moti-
vated to endorse an atomistic conception of racism as a problem of 
individual bias but are less likely to endorse a sociocultural concep-
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tion of racism as a problem inherent in the very fabric of American 
society (Adams, O’Brien, & nelson, 2006; Bobo, 2001). to investigate 
the consequences of these different conceptions, we constructed tutori-
als that took raw material from mainstream research—for example, 
discussions of stereotype threat (steele, 1997) and automatic racism 
(devine, 1989)—and presented it in one of two ways (Adams, edkins, 
lacka, Pickett, & cheryan, 2008). drawing heavily upon existing ped-
agogy, the standard tutorial presented the topic of racism in a relatively 
atomistic fashion as the product of biased individuals.3 in contrast, the 
sociocultural tutorial presented the topic of racism as something embed-
ded in the fabric of u.s. society. rather than portray racism as wide-
spread individual bias, it portrayed the pervasive nature of automatic 
racism as the tuning of the individual mind to ecologically inscribed 
associations and shared realities of racism (see sinclair & lun, chapter 
11, this volume). rather than consider racism as an afterthought to a 
discussion of stereotyping and prejudice, it emphasized the key insight 
of stereotype threat research: how the oppressive impact of racism is 
not limited to cases of individual bias but also includes a “threat in the 
air” that harms motivation and performance even in the absence of 
biased treatment (steele, 1997).
We then conducted two experiments—one online (study 1) and the 
other in a classroom lecture setting (study 2)—in which we randomly 
assigned white American participants to standard tutorial, sociocultural 
tutorial, or no-tutorial control conditions (Adams et al., 2008). After 
a few days, participants completed dependent measures. results con-
firmed that participants in the sociocultural tutorial condition perceived 
greater racism in ambiguous events (e.g., the use of indigenous people 
as mascots by sports teams) and showed greater support for antiracist 
policies (e.g., reparations for slavery) than did participants in the other 
two conditions.
Representations of History
Another manifestation of mind in context concerns the forms of histori-
cal knowledge that inform judgments about racism. in one paradigm, 
we have used a signal detection procedure to assess the relationship 
between knowledge of historically documented racist incidents (e.g., 
the tuskegee syphilis study) (Freimuth et al., 2001) and perception of 
racism in ambiguous current events (e.g., high rates of poverty in Afri-
can American communities) (nelson, Adams, Branscombe, & schmitt, 
2008; salter, 2008). results generally reveal that, regardless of race, 
perception of racism is positively related to accurate historical knowl-
edge. however, white Americans score lower on the measure of histori-
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cal accuracy than do black Americans, and this difference in knowledge 
of past racism partially accounts for group differences in perception of 
present racism in u.s. society.
in other research, we consider the consequences of engagement with 
different representations of the historical past. in one study, white Amer-
ican participants rated their familiarity with historical facts in one of 
three conditions: celebratory representations of black history that empha-
size past achievements of black Americans, critical representations that 
emphasize past instances of racism, and mainstream representations of 
u.s. history that render people of African descent invisible. Participants 
exposed to critical representations not only perceived greater racism in 
u.s. society but also indicated greater support for policies designed to 
ameliorate racial inequality than did participants in the other two condi-
tions (salter & Adams, 2009).
Representations of American Identity
Yet another instance of mind in context that underlies variability in per-
ception of racism concerns different representations of American iden-
tity. in one project, we investigated representations of American identity 
that differ in ideology regarding the multiethnic nature of u.s. soci-
ety (see Wolsko, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2000). Color-blind repre-
sentations of American identity deny racial and ethnic difference, and 
downplay the significance of ethnic and racial identity in u.s. society. 
in contrast, multicultural representations of American identity celebrate 
cultural differences and acknowledge the ongoing significance of ethnic 
and racial identity in u.s. society. We conducted both a correlational 
study, in which we measured endorsement of these representations (Phil-
lips & Adams, 2009; study 1), and an experiment in which we manipu-
lated exposure to these representations (Phillips & Adams, 2009; study 
2). Across both studies, results indicated that color-blind representations 
of American identity were associated with greater strength of American 
identification and stronger denial of racism than were multicultural rep-
resentations.
implications for the theme of “Mind in Context”
the preceding discussion of research on racism denial illuminates the 
theme of “mind in context” in the sense of the top arrow of Figure 14.1: 
the cultural constitution of psychological experience. rather than reflect-
ing a coolly rational perception of objective reality, this research suggests 
that white American tendencies to perceive little racism in ambiguous 
events reflect structures of mind in context—including representations 
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of racism, history, and American identity—that promote a tendency to 
understate the impact of racism in u.s. society.
however, this discussion also hints at a more provocative sense of 
“mind in context” related to the idea of “mind in society.” mainstream 
psychology takes it almost as given that whether the natural expression 
of genetically encoded instructions or the incorporation of ecologically 
represented structures, psychological processes happen inside individu-
als. in contrast, research on racism denial suggests the extent to which 
psychological processes also extend into the structure of everyday worlds. 
We consider this idea in relation to four psychological processes.
Memory
Psychologists have typically studied memory as individual representa-
tion. Although some have investigated sociocultural influences on mem-
ory (see Bartlett, 1932; Wang & ross, 2007), no less authoritative a 
source than the Handbook of Social Psychology locates its chapter on 
memory in a section titled “intrapersonal Phenomena” (smith, 1998). 
in contrast, a cP analysis suggests that one consider how memory also 
exists as ecological structures of mind in context (see smith & collins, 
chapter 7, this volume). the ecological location of memory is particu-
larly clear with respect to representations of history and collective mem-
ory (Wertsch, 2002). People do not have firsthand knowledge of past 
events; instead, their knowledge of the past comes from representations 
of history inscribed in cultural products (e.g., commemorative holidays, 
museums, official monuments, and textbooks) (Kurti, Adams, & Yel-
low Bird, in press; loewen, 1999; rowe, Wertsch, & Kosyaeva, 2002; 
Wertsch, 2002). however, the ecological location of memory is also 
evident in the apparently intrapersonal phenomenon of autobiographi-
cal memory. rather than individual reconstruction, autobiographical 
memory is a joint product that people actively construct in collaboration 
with listeners through culturally embedded conversational practices and 
other structures of mind in context (e.g., Wang & Brockmeier, 2002).
Identity
Given its link to memory, one can consider the extent to which identity 
is not merely limited to intrapersonal representations but also exists as 
ecological structures of mind in context inscribed in everyday cultural 
worlds. At the level of individual self, Pasupathi (2001) details how cul-
turally saturated conversational practices influence the stories people tell 
about experiences, which in turn influence what they remember about 
those experiences and how they reconstruct personal identity. more gen-
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erally, mcAdams (2001) proposes a conception of personal identity as 
a life story: a psychosocial construction, “coauthored by the person . . . 
and the cultural context within which that person’s life is embedded and 
given meaning” (p. 101). life stories are loosely based on biographi-
cal facts but go far beyond such facts as people integrate across diverse 
experiences to construct stories that make sense—both to themselves 
and to their audiences—according to culturally embedded narrative 
practices, understandings of the life course, and other ecological struc-
tures of mind in context (mcAdams, 2001). these perspectives empha-
size that personal identity is not simply a personal project but also rests 
on sociocultural structures of mind in context that provide ecological 
scaffolding for personal identity.
At the level of collective self, ecological structures of social iden-
tity include not only social representations of history (i.e., collective 
memory; liu & hilton, 2005), but also practices (“official” languages), 
artifacts (national flags), institutions (print media), and other structures 
of mind in context through which people imagine community with dis-
tant others (Anderson, 1983; Billig, 1995). these structures of mind in 
context are perhaps clearest in the case of national identity (reicher & 
hopkins, 2001). despite similar etymological roots, national identities 
are not natural; rather, they are continually reconstructed in innumer-
able acts of banal nationalism (e.g., reproducing national boundaries by 
imposing them on satellite maps of weather patterns; Billig, 1995). more 
generally, people actively coauthor a sense of racial/ethnic, gender, and 
other social identities based partly on not only biographical “facts” (e.g., 
skin color or particular genitalia), but also social representations of iden-
tity and other structures of mind in context (duveen, 2001; Philogene, 
2001). different representations of identity—icons like Chief Wahoo 
or disney’s Pocahontas, labels like First Nations or Indian—are not 
superficially different versions of the same thing; instead, they constitute 
somewhat different realties that have divergent implications for everyday 
experience (Adams, Fryberg, Garcia, & delgado-torres, 2006; Fryberg, 
markus, Oyserman, & stone, 2005). research comparing effects of 
color-blind versus multicultural representations of American identity on 
racism perception is an example of this idea (Phillips & Adams, 2009; 
see preceding section).
Motivation
As the link between memory and identity suggests, memory processes 
are subject to ego-defensive motivational pressures. At the level of indi-
vidual self, people remember their life story in ways that reflect and pro-
mote positive personal identity (e.g., Wilson & ross, 2003). At the level 
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of collective self, people remember historical events in ways that reflect 
and promote positive social identities (sahdra & ross, 2007; Wohl, 
Branscombe, & Klar, 2006). A cP analysis adds to these observations 
by illuminating implications for the idea of mind in context. When peo-
ple act based on preferences for identity-enhancing versions of the past, 
they reinscribe identity-enhancing representations of history in everyday 
worlds (i.e., the process represented by the bottom arrow of Figure 14.1). 
in other words, they produce ecological structures of motivation in con-
text that bear traces of their understandings and desires.
this idea is evident in an investigation of displays for Black history 
month (Bhm) in Kansas city area schools (salter & Adams, 2009). in 
one study, we observed that schools with majority white populations 
were more likely than schools with majority black populations (1) to 
use commercially available, “prepackaged” Bhm displays; (2) to link 
Bhm to larger issues of cultural diversity rather than civil rights; and (3) 
to deemphasize struggles against racism. evidence from a second study 
suggests that these differences were not coincidental. When we exposed 
white American undergraduates to photographs of these Bhm displays, 
they rated displays from majority-white schools to be more attractive 
and more familiar than the displays from majority-black schools. Briefly 
stated, these results suggest that the ecologies of memory and identity 
characteristic of the majority-white schools were not accidental, but 
instead resonated with white American preferences and motivations.
there is a small but potentially powerful way in which a discussion 
of motivation as mind in context differs from the preceding discussion 
of memory and identity. in the case of memory and identity, one might 
argue—consistent with the reductionist and individualist roots of social 
psychology (see Farr, 1996)—that associated structures of mind in con-
text are, at most, external storage of psychological content. People may 
draw upon these external stores in the process of remembering and con-
structing identity, but (the argument goes) the processes of memory and 
identity per se occur within individual minds.
Although one can dispute this reductionist interpretation even in 
the case of memory and identity (see Wertsch, 2002), its inadequacy is 
especially clear in the case of motivation. to illustrate, consider a person 
confronted with judgments about possible racism in u.s. society. even 
if she manages to approach the judgments in a nondefensive fashion, she 
must nevertheless draw upon mainstream representations of history and 
other ecologically inscribed structures of collective memory. informed 
by these ecological structures of memory, she is likely to conclude that 
racism plays little role. Yet the question remains: to what extent was her 
judgment the product of defensive motivations? in contrast to the stan-
dard analysis of motivation as an individual process, a cP analysis sug-
gests that even if the woman managed to set aside ego-defensive motiva-
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tions and evaluated evidence in an evenhanded fashion, her judgment 
is nevertheless motivated to the extent that the ecological structures 
of collective memory (also known as representations of history) that 
inform her judgment bear the identity-enhancing desires of the people 
who reproduced them (and silence other, more damning representations; 
cohen, 2001). in other words, the motivational forces that inform her 
judgment are not reducible to an individual motivation to deny racism. 
instead, these motivational forces reside outside her individual subjectiv-
ity, inscribed and objectified in everyday worlds as ecological structures 
of memory and identity that promote collectively “desired” action.
Intention
When we design courses that portray racism as individual bias (Adams 
et al., 2008; Pickett, 2007) or recount celebratory versions of history 
(salter & Adams, 2009; see loewen, 1995), we may not intend to pro-
mote denial of racism or opposition to corrective policy. even so, our 
behavior reinscribes structures of mind in context that—regardless of our 
individual intentions—promote these outcomes. reflecting the bottom 
arrow of Figure 14.1, people reproduce cultural worlds (e.g., psychology 
lectures about prejudice or Bhm bulletin boards) that infuse their par-
ticular understandings and desires into everyday reality. reflecting the 
top arrow of Figure 14.1, these ecological structures of mind in context 
subsequently afford denial of racism and opposition to corrective policy, 
even among people who might self-consciously intend otherwise.
in cP terms, one can say that atomistic constructions of racism 
or celebratory constructions of history constitute intentional worlds 
(shweder, 1990): ecological structures of mind in context that system-
atically direct experience toward particular ends. As in the discussion 
of motivation, the intention in “intentional worlds” need not reside in 
the individual subjectivity of the person reciting atomistic definitions of 
racism or reproducing celebratory constructions of history (as in the case 
of kids playing with plastic “cowboys and indians”; see Yellow Bird, 
2004). instead, the intention exists as a psychological trace, implicit in 
the behavioral sediment that previous waves of actors have deposited 
into everyday cultural worlds.
cOnclUsiOn: 
mind in cOnTexT as inTenTiOnal wOrlds
the concept of intentional worlds provides a powerful way to think about 
the theme of mind in context. ecological perspectives and discussions of 
automaticity have highlighted the extent to which features of everyday 
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worlds structure experience, typically outside of individual awareness 
(Bargh & chartrand, 1999; mcArthur & Baron, 1983). however, these 
perspectives have tended to talk about everyday worlds as natural facts 
that are more or less independent of human agency. in other words, these 
perspectives have emphasized one sense of “mind in context”: the extent 
to which the structures of mind in brain come to reflect the structure of 
everyday worlds. however, they typically have not emphasized the idea 
of “mind in society”: how mind not only reflects but also resides in the 
structure of everyday worlds (heft, 2007; hodges & Baron, 2007).
in contrast, a cP perspective highlights the intentional character of 
everyday worlds: not necessarily in the sense of “consciously or purpose-
fully designed” (although, as with formal education systems, this is often 
so; see cheney, 1987), but instead in the sense of “directive.” reflect-
ing the bottom arrow of Figure 14.1, this intentional character means 
that everyday worlds are not just natural. instead, they are human prod-
ucts, constituted by layers of behavioral sediment that bear the under-
standings, desires, and other psychological traces of their (re)producers. 
reflecting the top arrow of Figure 14.1, this intentional character means 
that everyday worlds are not neutral. instead, they carry a psychological 
charge that influences experience toward particular ends, regardless of 
whether their producers intend to imbue them with any charge.
in keeping with the individualist and reductionist roots of the sci-
ence, we social psychologists have tended to be wary of talk about col-
lective manifestations of mind. instead, we have typically retreated to 
atomistic philosophical positions that portray social-psychological phe-
nomena as the aggregate of separate individual experience.4 Although 
this portrayal distorts understanding of psychological functioning in 
general, it is clearly inadequate for understanding phenomena such as 
GsP episodes, the motivated nature of racism denial, and the racism 
inherent in mainstream representations of American history. these phe-
nomena require the more collective notion of mind associated with the 
concept of intentional worlds—not as a metaphysically dubious, super-
ordinate entity with its own subjectivity and consciousness but instead 
as psychological traces of behavior deposited in everyday worlds as eco-
logical structures of mind in context. conceived in this way, the notion 
of mind in context promises a truly social psychology that escapes the 
constraints of ontological and epistemological individualism.
nOTes
1. the most recent case to receive attention in Western media was an outbreak 
of GsP in the democratic republic of the congo in April 2008 (Bavier, 2008). 
Besides the similarity of reported cases to those that we describe in this chap-
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ter, a remarkable feature of these reports—for example, the fact that they 
appeared in forums, such as the section of the reuters website named “Oddly 
enough”—is the extent to which they reproduced stereotypes of primitive 
superstition and otherness. the incidents even figured prominently on the 
comedy central television network news production, The Daily Show with 
Jon Stewart (April 28, 2008), where an attitude of ridicule coexisted with 
(self-) censure for the attitude of ridicule: “We mentioned a big story coming 
out of the congo—no, not the ongoing, civil War–based, horrific violence—
i am talking about something causing a much bigger international uproar. . . . 
there is a penis theft panic in the congo!”
2. Although apparently an intrapersonal process, it is important to emphasize 
its collective nature. the self-fulfilling power of penis-shrinking belief to cre-
ate its own behavioral reality is greatest in settings in which the structures of 
mind in context associated with the belief are or have become strong.
3. this atomistic conception is evident in the titles of textbook chapters and 
psychology courses that deal with racism and oppression. For example, an 
online survey of instructors for undergraduate social psychology courses 
(Pickett, 2007) revealed that the titles of units relevant to racism and oppres-
sion overwhelmingly referred to prejudice (95%), stereotypes or stereotyping 
(46%), and discrimination (33%). no titles included the terms race or racism. 
likewise, the same survey revealed that instructors’ definitions of racism 
most commonly referred to discrimination (53%), prejudice (34%), attitudes 
(32%), and stereotyping (32%). Only a few respondents (11%) referred to 
collective or institutional forms of racism.
4. For extended discussions of ideas in this paragraph, see Farr (1996) and 
stryker (1997).
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